Friar Lawrence in William Shakespeares Romeo and Juliet Essay

Friar Lawrence of Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet In reading critical analysis of Shakespeare's "Romeo and Juliet" I found that many people call Friar Lawrence a moderate man who elicits to others his voice of wisdom and reason. An example of this sort of conclusion is George Ian Duthie's opinion that Lawrence is "A very worthy man", "prudent" and "worldly-wise"(xix.xx). G.B. Harrison views him as "sympathetically treated", "wise, grave, patient"(6). Due to this continuing interpretation, the view of Friar Lawrence has not really changed through the years. Mutschman and Wentersdorf followed the herd when they stated in their book that Shakespeare reveals no trace whatever of the widespread prejudices of non-Catholics in connection with this aspect of the life of the Roman Church. On the contrary: he does everything in his dramatic power to show his friars and nuns, their lives and customs, in an unequivocally favorable light. (267) I feel that these conclusions about the character of Friar Lawrence are not so completely true. His character needs deeper examination in spite of the conventional ideas that have been passed from one critic to another throughout the years. Lawrence's highly questionable actions in the drama need be looked at in regards to the position he holds as a man of the cloth. Are his actions wise and acceptable to the church? Is Lawrence a meddlesome man going against his vows to his religion? Or could he merely be yet another stock character that Shakespeare stole from his predecessors? A Historical Look Back In 1594 Shakespeare's audience would have been used to the convention of the friar or other religious persons as the brunt of jokes or humorous situation... ...ml. Byrne, Muriel St. Clare. Elizabethan life in Town and Country. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1954. Duthie, George Ian. Romeo and Juliet. Cambridge: J. Dover Wilson, 1955. Harrison, G.B. Shakespeare The Complete Works. New York: New York Press, 1952. Kennard, Joseph S. The Friar In Fiction. New York: Haskell House Publisher Ltd., 1923. Muir, Kenneth. "Shakespeare and Politics." Shakespeare in a Changing World. 1st. Arnold Kettle. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1964. 124-5. Mutschmann, Henrick, Karl Wentersdorf. Shakespeare and Catholicism. New York: AMS Press, 1969. Reed, Robert Rentoul Jr. Crime and God’s Judgement in Shakespeare. Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984. Simmons, Joseph Larry. Shakespeare’s Pagan World. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1973.

Divine intervention dealing with Greek myths Essay

Divine intervention is a feature of ancient Greek literature. One is amazed and even dumbfounded by the magical myths so frequently referred to. In Greek literature, the gods play an immense role in the lives and fates of the mortal dwellers of the earth. As one examines the gods throughout the myths and epic poems of the Greeks, one recieves a strong impression that the gods â€Å"play† with and manipulate mortals and each other. One goddess who exemplifies this is the great goddess Athena. This daughter of Zeus impacted everyone that she came across. The character Athena is â€Å"splashed† over Greek works. However, there are specific pieces of Greek literature that tell a great deal about this fiery goddess. This is not a passive goddess. This is an active, involved goddess who, in both the Iliad and the Odyssey, assumes divine leadership and challenges even Zeus himself. In The Odyssey and other Greek myths, Athena is an essential character and contributes many elem ents of her complex mythological personality to Greek writing. Athena is one of the most important goddesses in Greek mythology. In Roman mythology she became identified with the goddess Minerva. Also known as Pallas Athena. Athena sprang full-grown and armored from the forehead of the god Zeus and was his favorite child. He entrusted her with his shield, adorned with the hideous head of Medusa the Gorgon, his buckler, and his principal weapon, the thunderbolt. A virgin goddess, she was called Parthenos (â€Å"the maiden†). Her major temple, the Parthenon, was in Athens, which, according to legend, became hers as a result of her gift of the olive tree to the Athenian people. Athena was primarily the goddess of the Greek cities, of industry and the arts, and, in later mythology, of wisdom; she was also goddess of war. Athena was the strongest supporter, among the gods, of the Greek side in the Trojan War. After the fall of Troy, however, the Greeks failed to respect the sanctity of an altar to Athena at which the Trojan prophet Cassandra sought shelter. As punishment, storms sent by the god of the sea, Poseidon, at Athena’s request destroyed most of the Greek ships returning from Troy. Athena was also a patron of the agricultural arts and of the crafts of women, especially spinning and weaving. Among her gifts to man were the inventions of the plow and the flute and the arts of taming animals, building ships, and making shoes. She was often associated with birds, especially the owl. Through an explanation of Athena’s distinct  personality, her relationships are more easily understood The names and titles associated with this mythical goddess reflect her role as a person of action and leadership. Athena, also spelled Athene, is said to be the goddess of wisdom, battle and war, and certian crafts. Athena is frequently known as â€Å"Pallas† or â€Å"Pallas Athena.† According to Sawyer, Athena took on the extra name to commemorate the death of her friend, Pallas. She had accidentally killed Pallas while they were practicing spears. To show her deep grief, Athena added this name to all of her distinguishing titles. In the Odyssey Athena is given the title â€Å"Hope of Soliders† because she is so active in war (416). Athena, the patron of the city of Athens, is commonly linked with the subject of war. She is always depicted in armor and is said to be the keeper of Zeus’s shield, the Aegis, and his helmet (Sawyer). Athena was even born wearing armor. There are several different versions of the birth story of Athena. However, they all are basically similar. Zeus was supposedly in love with Metis, the Titaniss of wisdom, who was to have Zeus’s baby. Zeus had heard that any baby that Metis had would be greater than the father. So, Zeus turned Metis into a fly and swallowed her. After some time, Zeus developed a sharp headache and asked Hephaesios, the blacksmith god, to split his head open with an axe. When he did, Athena â€Å"popped out† fully grown and fully armed (Sawyer). The fully grown woman carried many names during her life, although they did not change the way she thought or acted. Mortals recognized Athena’s active role as an influence and intercessor with others. This is what made Athena so â€Å"popular† with the Greek people. In the Odyssey by Homer, Athena has an incredible relationship with Odysseus. After reading the epic poem, one can witness the very complete, very extensive bond she develops with not only Odysseus but with the other characters as well. At the opening of the book, Athena begs her father Zeus to allow her to aid Odysseus, so he can go home to his family (Odyssey 1-2). She says,†My own heart is broken for Odysseus† (Odyssey 3). Athena goes as far as enhancing his appearance so that Princess Nausikaa will be sure to help him reach home (Odyssey 105). Once Odysseus reaches the city that Nausikaa leads him to, Athena â€Å"pours a sea fog† around him to protect him, and she takes on  the form of a small girl in order to show him the way to the palace (Odyssey 111-112). Once Athena leads Odysseus home to Ithaka, she disguises herself as a sheperd boy and makes conversation with her beloved Odysseus (Odyssey 238). However, she eventually transforms herself into her natural state and says: Two of a kind, we are, contrivers, both. Of all the men alive you are the best in plots and story telling. My own fame is for wisdom among the gods – deceptions too. Would even you have guessed that I am Pallas Athena, daughter of Zeus, I that am always with you in times od trial, a shield to you in battle† (Odyssey 240). Athena demonstrates throughout the Odyssey and in her relationship with Odysseus that she is a goddess of action just as Odysseus is a man of action. She states, â€Å"I am here again to counsel with you† (Odyssey 240). It is Athena who plots and plans the fall of the suitors in Odysseus’ house. To follow her plan, Athena disguises Odysseus into a beggar and leads him to the swineherd, a faithful servant. There they unite with Telemakhos, Odysseus’ son, to carry out the plot of doom (Odyssey Books 13 and 14). Once they go to the palace, the goddess of war and her followers destroy and cast revenge upon the suitors of Penelope. Athena flaunts her warlike qualities creating battle in which her â€Å"side† was undoubtedly the victor (Odyssey Book 22). Throught the mist of confusion and blood, Athena makes sure to keep Odysseus and Telemakhos safe. The goddess even â€Å"held the night† so that Odysseus and Penelope could have longer to get reacquainted . Homer comments that â€Å"she held Dawn’s horses† (437). Athena demonstrates her role as an active leader in her protection of Telemakhos. In the beginning of the epic poem, the Odyssey, she â€Å"flies† to him in the shape of Mentes, a Taphian captian, to talk to him and urge him to look for his father, Odysseus. While with him, she sits, drinks, dines, and carries on conversation (Odyssey 415). Later, she also takes on Mentor’s figure to talk to him. At the end of the Odyssey, the war goddess enhances Laertes’ looks for his reunion with his son Odysseus (Odyssey Book 24). In the final scene, she takes up the form of Mentor once more to bring peace to the bickering people (Odyssey 460). It is elementary to see how intensly Athena makes contact with mortals  by just few examples. Other gods and goddesses are involved in these works, but none are so explicit and immense as the deeds of Athena. From reading the Odyssey, one can begin to form an image of Athena’s relationships with her peers, the other gods and goddessess of ancient Greece. Through the interactions between this goddess and other supreme beings, one can witnessAthena’s beliefs that she is superior to the other. Athena assumes leadership by taking action, making decisions, and intervening for good and evil. In the Odyssey, Athena begs Zeus to allow her to give Odysseus aid on his passage home, against the efforts and wishes of Poseidon, the Sea god (Odyssey 4). One can see that Athena does what she thinks gives the best result, even if she is faced with stiff opposition from her peers. The goddess Athena is definitely a dominant figure, accepting no authority except perhaps Zeus. When thinking of this outstanding goddess, one thinks of her relationships and extensive contact with many mortals. The Greeks favored her because she was a woman goddess of rare quality. Women were never protrayed with the masculine characteristics of Athena, such as her need for dominance and passion for war. This makes her more appealing and puts her in a class above all the rest. By reading both the Ilaid and the Odyssey, one can recieve a clear, precise view of Athena.

Various Motives for Corporate Takeovers - Free Essay Example

Sample details Pages: 8 Words: 2514 Downloads: 6 Date added: 2017/06/26 Category Business Essay Type Analytical essay Did you like this example? Mergers and Acquisitions (MA) occur when two or more organisations join together all or part of their operations (Coyle, 2000). Strictly defined, a corporate takeover refers to one business acquiring another by taking ownership of a controlling stake of another business, or taking over a business operation and its assets (Coyle, 2000). Corporate takeovers have been occurring for many decades, and have historically occurred on a cyclical basis, increasing and decreasing in volume in what has been termed merger waves since the late 1800s (Sudarsanam, 2010). Don’t waste time! Our writers will create an original "Various Motives for Corporate Takeovers" essay for you Create order There can be a number of distinct motives for corporate MA and this short essay will discuss a number of these, drawing on theoretical and financial theory as well as empirical evidence to explain their rationale. The first group of motives to be discussed are those that relate and can be explained by the classical approach to financial theory (Icke, 2014). These motives assume that firms do not make mistakes and acquire other companies as they believe that doing so will result in increased profitability (Baker Nofsinger, 2010) as they allow for the achievement of enhanced economies of scale or scope (Lipcynski et al., 2009). This theoretical perspective can be used to explain a number of motives. First, corporate takeovers can be used as a route to achieving geographic expansion. By acquiring another company in a different country or with more geographically-diverse operations, an acquiring company can expand its markets and thus expand its sales opportunities. The larger bus iness post-acquisition can then, if implemented efficiently, benefit from economies of scale associated with reducing unit input costs, ultimately increasing profitability. A second reason for completing a takeover could be to increase market share within a market a firm is already operating in. This can result in increased profits through again allowing for increased economies of scale through decreasing unit costs and can also increase profitability by reducing the number of competitors in a market. Thirdly, acquiring businesses at different stages in the supply chain, known as vertical integration (Icke, 2014), can allow for enhanced profitability as it can facilitate enhanced value in the supply chain and the potential to exercise control and scale benefits over inputs to production and the overall cost of output. Other motives for corporate takeovers can be categorised as being more consistent with the behavioural school of thought. This considers that MA is driven by factors other than for pure profit maximization (Icke, 2014; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). There a number of reasons why MA may take place where the opportunity to benefit from scale economies is not the key driver. First, a company may engage in an acquisition in a bid to increase their size to prevent bids from other companies. This is consistent with the concept of eat or be eaten (Gorton et al., 2005) which hypothesizes that during waves of MA activity, firms feel vulnerable to takeover bids and as such feel compelled to engage in their own MA activity in order to increase their size and minimize interest from potential bids. A second motive for MA that relates more to the behavioural school (but does possess some economic basis) is the opportunistic MA activity associated with management taking advantage of a relative increase in the value of its stock to acquire a target in an equity-funded acquisition. In this case, it is the perceived opportunity to buy another company cheaply that drives the acquisition, rather than the profit motive if all other variables are held equal. What empirical evidence do we have in regard to value creation following a takeover for: the bidder firms shareholders the acquired firms shareholders Mergers and Acquisitions (MA) occur when two or more organisations join together all or part of their operations (Coyle, 2000). A number of empirical studies have been performed in order to ascertain the extent of value creation following a takeover for both the bidder firm and the acquired firm. Shareholders of the acquired firm have consistently experienced positive value impacts (Icke, 2012; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008) following completion of a takeover, while evidence of value creation following a takeover for the acquirer has been inconsistent and is broadly considered to be inconclusive (Angwin, 2007). This essay will discuss the empirical evidence of the value impact following corporate takeovers for both parties, looking at a broad range of evidence spanning the time following announcement to the fiscal years following completion of a takeover. The essay will briefly discuss the limitations of the evidence based on the highly differentiated nature of the MA landscape and the presence of significant independent variables. It will then evaluate the results before arguing that for the bidder firms shareholders evidence of value creation is broadly inconclusive and that it appears that any value creation that is witnessed differs depending on the type and motives for the acquisition, as well as when it is taking place. It will argue that, as is consistent with the majority of empirical studies, value creation for the acquired companys shareholders is positive (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). The value creation experienced by shareholders in the bidder firm following a takeover can be considered both post announcement and in the years following completion and integration of the businesses. Value impacts at announcement are most profound in the impact of share price fluctuations while performance-based metrics, such as profitability, can be used to assess value impacts following takeover (Icke, 2012). First looking at the empirical evidence that su pports positive value creation for the acquiring shareholders it is clear that there are a number of studies that demonstrate the positive value creating effects of a cross-section of transaction types. Looking at the US and Europe, Martynova and Renneboog (2008) measure the value impacts following a takeover by studying a century of historical MA transactions. The evidence indicates that in the case of European cross-border transactions, value is created in terms of post-acquisition performance. Looking at developing countries, Kumar (2009) finds that in the case of developing economies, acquirer shareholders tend to experience better returns in both the short and long term following an acquisition than in developed economies. Gugler et al (2003), look specifically at the impact on sales and profitability of a takeover and find that acquisitions have a statistically significant impact on profit of the acquiring company. Chari et al. (2010) look at cross-border transactions and prov ides evidence that the acquirers will experience improved post-merger performance, but that this is dependent on having intangible asset advantages that can be exploited abroad. Villalonga (2004) studied diversification takeovers in a study that reviewed the share price performance of diversified conglomerates versus non-diversified trading peers in the years following the transaction. The evidence reveals that diversified firms actually trade at a large and significant premium to their peers, thus suggesting that this type of acquisition can drive long term value gain for shareholders in the post-acquisition entity. Draper and Paudyal (2006) studied the value creating impacts of private versus public takeovers and found that value creation for the acquiring company when the target is private is broadly positive. An empirical study by Icke (2014) looks at European and US MA transactions by motive for takeover and finds that, in terms of announcement effects on share price, transacti ons driven by an increase in market share, research development synergies and vertical transactions are rewarding for the acquiring company. In terms of longer term gains, Icke (2014) shows that transactions driven by increase in market share, geographic expansion, vertical integration and diversification all have a positive effect. In contrast, there is a wide body of empirical research which contrasts with the findings of the above studies and covers a range of different MA situations where value is in fact destroyed for the acquiring company shareholder both in terms of share price at announcement and in terms of post-integration performance. In a study that considers a broad range of takeover motivations, Walker (2000) finds that acquiring companies experience overall negative value impacts and those anomalies in which acquirers actually gain in the longer term are so infrequent they are considered to be statistically insignificant. When Martynova and Renneboog (2008) study US transactions aimed at achieving diversification the evidence indicates that post-acquisition value is destroyed for acquiring shareholders following a transaction and that wealth effects at announcement for acquirers are inconclusive. In a 2005 study, Powell and Stark (2005) find that post-acquisition performance in terms of sales impact, is actually positive for the acquirer, however, when this is controlled for extra working capital, the effect is inconclusive and likely a net negative result. Looking at vertical integration takeovers, both Kedia et al (2011) and Walker (2000) find that in the case of US transactions, takeovers result in value destruction for acquiring company shareholders. Icke (2014) also found that RD driven takeovers have a negative effect. The empirical evidence in relation to target firms shareholder value creation is significantly more conclusive across the spectrum of types of MA. Empirical studies, which tend to focus on value creation for the owner s of target companies primarily looks at shareholder value at announcement (Icke, 2014) in the form of share price rises and the premiums acquirers pay. Martynova and Renneboog (2008) find that targets gain value from announcement of a takeover and furthermore find that this gain is consistent across merger cycles, regardless of whether the takeover occurs during the peak or the low of the merger waves witnessed throughout the past century (Martynova and Renneboog 2008). Their study into US takeovers demonstrates that the value creation is significant in size, often reaching double digit growth on the value prior to announcement. In a study of hostile versus friendly takeovers, Shwert (1996) found that target shareholders experience significant gains from a takeover that has come about as a result of a tender process, rather than a hostile a single party bidding round, although found broadly positive results across both types for target shareholders. Likewise, studying the method of payment and the impact on value creation for target shareholders, Goergen and Renneboog (2004) found that all-cash offers trigger ARs of almost 10 percent upon announcement whereas all-equity bids or offers combining cash, equity and loan notes only generated a return of 6 percent but still resulted in positive value creation for the target company. Empirical studies have also been conducted on transaction data based around the concept of merger waves. That is to look at transactions not as isolated occurrences but as events that have taken place within one of the six identified waves of MA activity since the late 1800s (Sudarsanam, 2010). By looking at takeovers from the perspective of when they occurred, it is possible to identify more consistent patterns in value creation and to derive theories of attribution for these gains. Icke (2014) reviews a number of studies and finds that value creation for shareholders in both the target and the acquiring company varies depending on the wave in which it occurs when other variables are considered to be constant. Icke (2014) shows that the third wave generated largely positive returns for parties engaged in takeovers, while the fourth was broadly negative and the value impacts were indistinguishable during the fifth. This evidence of environment-sensitivity adds further complexity to the evidence surrounding value creation in takeovers. Overall there is a wealth of empirical evidence available into the value impacts of corporate takeovers, however, the evidence is broadly inconclusive in determining the value creating opportunities for acquirers while it is broadly conclusive that target company shareholders will gain (Martynova and Renneboog 2008). The inconclusive nature is caused by methodological inconsistencies as a result of mixed methods, the difficulty capturing operational change, the different time periods and sample size distortions (Icke, 2014) as well as the vastly differentiated base of empirical evidence that exists, as discussed in this essay. As Icke (2014) states, the value effects of takeovers are, ultimately, non-conclusive. However, based on the empirical evidence discussed in this essay and drawing on Wang and Moini (2012), the general conclusion can be seen to be that in short-term event studies (addressing the impacts post-announcement) acquirers will either experience some normal returns or significant losses, while the target firms have shown to consistently experience positive value creation in the same timeframe. Post-acquisition performance is extremely difficult to measure and the evidence has been mixed. Furthermore, as Angwin (2007) argues, strategic motivations are essential for understanding post-takeover performance and for measuring the isolated effects of the takeover. In conclusion, there exists a number of studies and a diverse body of empirical evidence into the value creating effects of takeovers for both target and acquirer shareholders. For t arget shareholders, studies focus on the announcement effects and are broadly positive, while for acquirer shareholders, studies look at both announcement and post transaction performance and show a broadly negative value impact with some evidence of positive value creation in certain types of MA scenario and during certain periods (waves) in history. Bibliography Angwin, D (2007). Motive Archetypes in Mergers and Acquisitions (MA): The implications of a Configurational Approach to Performance. Advances in Mergers and Acquisitions. 6. pp77-105. Baker, KH and Nofsinger, JR. (2010). Behavioral Finance: Investors Corporations and Markets. Hoboken, Nj:John Wiley Sons Inc. Chari, A., Ouimet, P.P. and Tesar L.L.. (2010). The value of control in emerging markets. Review of Financial Studies. 23(4). pp1741-1770. Coyle, B (2000). Mergers and Acquisitions. Kent: Global Professional Publishing. Draper P. and Paudyal K. (2006). Acquisitions: Private versus Public. European Financial Management. 12(1). pp57-80. Goergen, M and Renneboog, L (2004). Shareholder Wealth Effects of European Domestic and CrossBorder Takeover Bids. European Financial Management. 10(1). pp9-45. Gugler, K., D.C. Mueller, B.B. Yurtoglu and Ch. Zulehner (2003). The Effect of Mergers: An International Comparison. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 21(5). pp625-653. Icke, D (2014). AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF VALUE CREATION THROUGH MERGERS ACQUISITIONS A STRATEGIC FOCUS. Aarhus University, Business Social Sciences [online]. Available at: https://pure.au.dk/portal/files/68137404/Final_Thesis_31.12.2013_Daniel_Michael_Icke.pdf Kedia, S., Ravid, S.A., Pons, V. (2011).When Do Vertical Mergers Create Value?. Financial Management. 40(4). 845-877. Kumar, N. 2009. How emerging giants are rewriting the rules of MA. Harvard Business Review. 87(5). pp115-121. Lipczynski, J., Wilson, O.S. and Goddard, J. (2009). Industrial Organization: Competition, Strategy, Policy. Third edition. Essex, England: Pearson Education Limited. Martynova, M and Renneboog, L (2008). A Century of Corporate Takeovers: What Have We Learned and Where Do We Stand?. Journal of Banking Finance. 32(10). pp2148- 2177. Powell, RG. and Stark, AW. (2005). Does operating performance increase post-takeover for UK takeovers? A comparison of performance measures and benchmarks. Journal of Corporate Finance. 11(1-2), pp293-317. Schwert G.W. (1996). Markup Pricing in Mergers and Acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics. 41(2). pp153-192. Sudarsanam, S (2010). Creating Value from Mergers and Acquisitions The Challenges. Essex, England: Pearson Hall. Villalonga, B.N. (2004). Diversification Discount or Premium? New Evidence from the Business Information Tracking Series. The Journal of Finance. 59(2). pp 479-506. Wang,D. and Moini, H. (2012). Performance Assessment of Mergers and Acquisitions: Evidence from Denmark. [online]. Available at: https://www.g-casa.com/conferences/berlin/papers/Wang.pdf Walker, MM (2000). Corporate Takeovers, Strategic Objects, and Acquiring-Firm Shareholder Wealth. Financial Management. 29(200). pp55-66.